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COMMENTS
CORPORATIONS AND lNCORPORATORS OF lNCORPORATORS -

PREINCORPORATION CONTRACTS OF PROMOTERS
EFFECT OF STATUTE ON PERSONAL LIABILITY
In a recent case 1 the Michigan court was con-

1 In re Montreuil's Estate, 291 Mich. 582, 289 N. W. 262 (1939). The facts
were that Montreuil, one of the incorporators of a brewing corporation, ordered brewing
vats from the claimant three days prior to incorporation, stating that he was ordering
to save time and on behalf of the corporation to be formed, and that the board of
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fronted by the old and often troublesome problem of the personal liability of a promoter or incorporator upon a contract purporting to be
made by or for the proposed corporation but made before its incorporation. The most interesting feature of the decision was the effect given
to that section of the Michigan corporation code which provides:
"No contract made by the incorporators for or on behalf of
any corporation to be formed preliminary to the :filing of the
articles shall be deemed to be invalid or ineffectual because made
prior to such :filing, and all property held by such incorporators
for the benefit of the proposed corporation shall be deemed to be
the property of such corporation." 2
Under this statute, it was held, the promoter-incorporator is, in effect,
an agent of the corporation even before its incorporation and in the
absence of a personal pledge is not liable personally on the contract.
In other words, the decision seems to indicate that this section alters the
common-law rule that there can be no agency for a non-existent principal and destroys the presumption, :first definitely formulated in
Kelner v. Baxter,8 that the personal liability of the promoter is intended
in the absence of a clear showing to the contrary.
1

I.

It seems difficult to draw such a conclusion directly from the terms
of the statute. Indeed, the section is not very definite as to the liability
either of the incorporators or of the corporation on contracts of the
designated class. However, in Hart Potato Growers' Association v.
Grenier,4 it was intimated that this section made the corporation liable
upon the contracts of the incorporators immediately upon incorporation.
Toward this conclusion certain provisions of the section are rather
persuasive. The clause providing that all property held by the incorporators for the benefit of the corporation shall be deemed to be the
property of the corporation is mandatory and contemplates, appardirectors would confirm the contract immediately upon incorporation. Claimant collected a portion of the debt from the corporation before and in bankruptcy proceedings
and then filed this claim against the estate of the incorporator. The court found no
intention to bind the decedent personally was to be implied from the contract, and
that the incorporator might be treated as an agent. The case is particularly interesting in
its approach, which indicates perhaps that the Michigan court has never been completely
committed to the doctrine of Kelner v. Baxter, L. R. 2 C. P. 174 (1886). See also,
Hart Potato Growers' Assn. Y. Grenier, 236 Mich. 638, 2II N. W. 45 (1926);
Esper v. Miller, 131 Mich. 334, 91 N. W. 613 (1902).
2
Mich. Pub. Acts (1931), No. 327, § 8.
3
L. R. 2 C. P. 174 (1886).
'236 Mich. 638, 2II N. W. 45 (1926).
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ently, no action by the corporation. Further, the limitation of the class
of contracts designated by the statute to those made by the incorporators alone, and made expressly for or on behalf of the corporation, is
surely not inconsistent with a legislative intention to bind the corporation. In fact, the section suggests, though somewhat vaguely, that
an agency concept is at the basis of the statute.
The possibility of such a statutory provision as this was said to be
in the Hart Potato Growers case has long been recognized 5 as an
exception to the general rule that a corporation is not liable upon contracts · made for it, but before incorporation, save by its own acts
amounting to adoption, ratification, novation or acceptance of a continuing offer. It is customary to insert in the English charters provisions
providing for payment of preliminary expenses,6 and a few instances
of such provisions may be found in the United States. 7 These charter
or statutory provisions seem to be uniformly held to bind the corporation, but their effect upon the promoter's liability does not seem to have
been- considered. by the courts. However, there are some early cases
which seem to regard the promoters as agents of the corporation in
holding the corporation bound upon the promoters' contracts even
though made before incorporation and not subsequently adopted, and
though there were no charter or statutory provisions binding the corporation. 8
The Michigan statute· does not, however, follow the usual pattern
for such provisions. It provides only that contracts of the designated
class may not be deemed "invalid or ineffectual." They must, therefore, be considered effectual and valid; but as to whom must they be
considered effectual and valid? As to the corporation such contracts
have never been considered as invalid or void, except perhaps in some
of the English cases,9 for the corporation may by its acts alone secure
5 Mitchell v. Patterson, 120 Cal. 286, 52 P. 589 (1898); Scott v. Lord Ebury,
L. R. 2 C. P. 255 at 264 (1886); Tilson v. Warwick Gas Light Co., 4 Barn. & Cres.
962, 107 Eng. Rep. 1317 (1825); In re Brampton & Longtown Ry., L. R. IO Ch.
App. 177 (1875).
6 For typical provisions, see the English cases cited supra, note 5. Whether the
corporation is directly liable in these instances or whether it is liable only to the
promoters is not clear. Cf. Re Tilleard, 3 DeG., J. & S. 519, 46 Eng. Rep. 736
(1863) (liable directly to third parties-opinion of Knight Bruce, L. J.), with
Wyatt v. Metropolitan Board of Works, I I C. B. (N. S.) 744, 142 Eng. Rep. 988
(1862); and see 17 A. L. R. 452 at 505 (1922).
7 E.g., Mitchell v. Patterson, 120 Cal. 286, 52 P. 589 (1898).
8 See 26 L. R. A. 544 ( l 89 5) and cases discussed therein.
9 1 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CoRPORATIONS, perm. ed., § 207 (1931), especially
with regard to the statutory prohibition of adoption on which the English doctrine
was based.
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the benefit of such contracts upon any one of the various analyses which
American courts have made of preincorporation contracts.10 Similarly,
even without the statute these contracts can hardly be said to be entirely
ineffectual or invalid as to the promoters who make them. However,
the fact that the section is included in the corporation code probably indicates that the provision is intended primarily to affect the corporation.
Assuming a contract in which the personal liability of the promoter is
clearly denied and in which there is no independent consideration for
the promise of the party with whom the promoter contracts, the statute
would still apply if the contract was "for or on behalf" of the corporation. Without the statute, the contract, while perhaps not invalid, would
certainly be practically ineffectual as to the corporation since it could
be construed only as a revocable continuing offer to the corporation.
The mandatory character of the statute, indicated especially by the
property provision, suggests strongly that in the case assumed the
contract is to have some effect upon the corporation beyond that which
the contract would have without the statutory provision. In order to
accomplish this purpose, the logical method is to construe the statute
as binding the corporation on such a contract as that assumed. Since the
statute is not limited to the narrow type of contracts presented by the
assumed situation, but only to those of the incorporators made for or
on behalf of the corporation, it seems proper to treat it as binding the
corporation on all contracts coming within the statutory classification.
The lack of resemblance to the typical English provisions may be properly disregarded, since the limitation of those provisions is generally
either to the expenses of incorporation 11 or to a specified amount while
the limitation of the instant section is to the contracts made in a certain manner by a narrow class of persons-an entirely different scheme
of limitation. The corporation is, therefore, to be bound on this class of
contracts immediately upon incorporation; but what of the incorator who made the contract for the corporation?
2.

It is stated to be the general rule that a promoter is liable upon
all contracts made before incorporation, unless there is a clear showing
10

In general on the various theories of corporate adoption, see I FLETCHER,
CYCLOPEDIA CoRPORATIONS, perm. ed., § 207 et seq. (1931); and annotations, 17
A. L. R. 452 (1922); 123 A. L. R. 726 (1939).
11
The aim of the provisions seems to be often only to reimburse the promoters
for expenditures in organization. See cases cited in note 5, supra. On the other hand
the provision considered in Mitchell v. Patterson, 120 Cal. 286, 52 P. 589 ( 1898),
is an unambiguous grant of power to contract for organizational purposes up to a
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that the personal liability of the promoter was not intended.1z This is,
however, more nearly a conclusion of fact than a rule of law. For a promoter is not held liable upon his preincorporation contracts as a promoter but upon various theories depending upon the circumstances
and type of the contract which he made. Thus, the theory of liability
will vary according to whether or not the promoter disclosed the nonexistence of his corp~rate principal.13 In the event that the promoter
fails to disclose the non-existence of the corporation for which he purports to act, his liability rests either upon his warranty of authority
or upon the misrepresentation or both.14 Even if the statute made the
corporation liable upon such a contract, the misrepresentation remains
and the promoter's liability will, consequently, be unaffected by the
statutory provision. Quite a different result is occasioned by the full
disclosure of the corporate non-existence. In that case the common-law
liability of the promoter is dependent upon a theory whose postulates
must be examined carefully to appreciate the application of the Michigan statute.
This theory is that the promoter is liable because such was the intention of the parties. If the intention may fairly be deduced from the
contract, no difficulty arises in holding the promoter liable. The difficulty arises from the fact that it is rarely true that the parties in fact
intend that the promoter shall be liable personally upon the contract.
The conventional method of solving the difficulty is to presume the
intention by requiring a clear showing to the contrary. The technical
argument in favor of this approach, first clearly enunciated in Kelner
v. Baxter,15 takes the form of a dilemma. Either the parties intended
the promoter to be personally liable or no one is intended to be liable.
But to permit the inference that no one is intended to be liable renders
the contract a nugatory act, a situation which the parties do not gen- erally intend. Therefore, unless there is a clear showing that the parties
did intend a nugatory act, they must be taken to have intended the perspecified sum. The somewhat different purpose of the Michigan statute may be to
permit contracts facilitating the business of the corporation, not merely organization, to
be made by the incorporators without waiting for incorporation. The practical utility
of this power may be considerable.
12 1 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CoRPORATIONs, perm. ed., § 215 (1931); I
MACHEN, CoRPORATIONs, § 358 (1908); EHRICH, P-ROMOTERS, § 77 (1916); and
see generally, Ehrich and Bunzl, "Promoters' Contracts," 38 YALE L. J. IOII (1929).
13 There is, of course, no doubt of the promoter's liability where the corporation
is not mentioned at all, since on ordinary contract principles it must be taken to be his
personal contract.
14
See, e.g., Ennis Cotton-Oil Co. v. Burks, (Tex. Civ. App. 1897) 39 S. W.
966; Haines v. Franklin, (C. C. Pa. 1898) 87 F. 139.
15
L. R. 2 C. P. 174 (1886); EHRICH, PROMOTERS, § 77 (1916); I MACHEN,
CORPORATIONS, § 358 (1908).
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sonal liability of the promoter. However, personal liability upon the
contract as if it were the personal contract of the promoter does not
follow from the argument. It has already been pointed out that, even
if the promoter is liable in no manner, the contract may be construed
as a continuing offer to the corporation and thus not entirely nugatory.
Moreover, even accepting the proposition that unless the promoter is
intended to be liable the contract is a nugatory act, it does not follow
that his liability is intended to be the same as if the contract were made
without mention of the corporation. A different analysis has been suggested which does not lead to this result and which seems more in
accord with the ordinary intention of the parties. 16 This view is that
the parties ordinarily intend only that the promoter shall secure the
formation of the corporation as represented and secure adoption of
the contract by the corporation.17 Only in the event of failure to do so,
is it thought that his liability is intended. 18 This suggestion appears at
least as technically sound as the more conventional approach, and considerably more in accord with the usual understanding of the parties.
Sometimes the liability of the promoter is said to be that of an
agent who acts for a non-existent principal.10 Again upon the reasoning
that the parties do not intend a nugatory act, it is presumed that the
personal liability of the agent is intended. Against this reasoning, the
same objections apply as against the more direct method of arriving at
the presumption of personal liability. Further, taken in conjunction
with the undoubted duty of the promoter to organize the corporation
as he represented, the Michigan statute seems to justify treating the
incorporators as statutory agents, despite the non-existence of the
corporate principal. For the incorporators have made a contract which
Ehrich and Bunzl, "Promoters' Contracts," 38 YALE L. J. IOII (1929).
In general, see Ehrich and Bunzl, "Promoters' Contracts," 38 YALE L. J. l0II
( 1929). That this is the only liability actually intended seems to be borne out by
the afterthought nature of many cases where it is sought to hold the promoter liable
personally after collecting partially from the corporation. The principal case is an
excellent example of this type. Similarly the argument is borne out by those decisions
which hold that the promoter is not personally liable after the corporation adopts the
contract. Likewise, the argument made by Professor Williston in contending for the
view that corporate adoption is by way of novation, consented to in advance, is based
on the same interpretation of the usual intention of the parties. See 1 WILLISTON, CoNTRACTS, rev. ed., § 306 (1936); Van Vlieden v. Welles, 6 Johns. (N. Y.) 85 (1810);
Brown v. Swarthout, 134 Mich. 585, 96 N. W. 951 (1903); Bradshaw v. Jones,
(Tex. Civ. App. 1913) 152 S. W. 695; Heckman's Estate, 172 Pa. 185, 33 A. 552
(1895); Harrill v. Davis, 94 C. C. A. (8th) 47, 168 F. 187 (1909). Also, EHRICH,
PROMOTERS, § 78 (1916).
18
Kirschmann v. Lediard, 61 Barb. (N. Y.) 573 (1872); Reisen v. Churchill,
(C. C. A. 7th, 1913) 205 F. 368.
1
1> 2 AGENCY, RESTATEMENT, § 326, comment a (1933).
16

17
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is effectual against the corporation by statute and have assumed a duty
to organize the corporation so that it will be liable. If not a technical
common-law agency, this is a quite similar thing, and, in the absence
of a personal pledge by the incorporators, there seems to be no substantial objection to treating them as if they were agents. One of the
objections to .releasing the promoter upon the ground that his principal had ratified the transaction has been that the ratification cannot
relate back before the time at which the corporation attained legal
existence.20 To this it might be answered that the relation back is fictional in any case, and even if ordinarily there must be some mandate to
which the ratification may relate back, the statutory authority of the incorporators to bind the corporation is quite sufficient to justify treating
the incorporators as agents whose acts have been ratified by their
principal.

3.
The validity of such an application of the statute is, of course, not
really dependent upon these technical considerations. At most this section of the corporation code offers only a convenient method of answering the argument made upon an agency analogy, and is slightly persuasive toward refusing to apply the presumption that the incorporators are intended to be liable as if it were their personal contract. The
soundness of a policy which gives to persons contracting with promoters
for a corporation not yet formed the double security of corporate liability after adoption and personal liability of the promoter may well
be doubted. In addition to the fact that the parties probably do not
ordinarily contemplate this situation, and that courts are often prone
to hold that credit was adv~nced only to the corporation, even though
giving lip service to the doctrine of Kelner v. Baxter, several other
indications may be noted tending to show the weakness of double
security as a policy. There is authority to the effect that adoption by
the corporation releases the liability of the promoter. This result is
reached either by interpreting it as the intention of the parties 21 or by
following the analysis of corporate adoption suggested by Professor
Williston.22 In the latter alternative, corporate adoption is conceived
of as taking place by a novation to which the party with whom the
promoter deals and the promoter himself consented in advance. Inherent in this suggestion, as in the other factors pointed out, is a rejec-

°

2 Kelner v. Baxter, L. R. 2 C. P. 174 (1886). Accord: 1 AGENCY RESTATEMENT,
§ 84(2) (1933). But see Tulsa Tribune Co. v. Commr. of Internal Revenue, (C. C. A.
10th, 1932) 58 F. (2d) 937.
21 E.g., Carle v. Corhan, 127 Va. 223, 103 S. E. 699 (1920); Esper v; Miller,
131 Mich. 334, 91 N. W. 613 (1902).
22 I WILLISTON, CoNTRAcTS, rev. ed.,§ 306 (1936).
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tion of the double security policy. In support of the policy it may be
said that the person who advances credit knows nothing definite about
the corporation and cannot check upon its credit, capitalization, financial position or possibilities. Manifestly it would be unjust to hold that
the promoter or incorporator might escape liability by the organization
of a corporation insufficiently capitalized or financed. However, it is
not necessary to hold the promoter liable as if the contract had been
made by him purely in his individual capacity in order to afford protection from faulty organization. It has already been shown that the
making of the contract carries with it a duty, either express or implied,
on the promoter to organize the corporation as proposed. Surely this
duty assumed by the promoter when he attempts to act for the proposed corporation is not merely to organize any corporation but to
organize a corporation reasonably calculated to carry out the contracts
he has made for it-i.e., sufficiently capitalized and financed .. Nothing
in the decision in the principal case indicates that the incorporator's
liability for failure to organize a corporation is lessened by the statute.
Nor does it seem that there is any objection to inferring that the duty
to organize that is impliedly assumed by the incorporator is not performed merely by organization of a corporation which has no reasonable chance of fulfilling the contracts made for it. The act of making
the contract on behalf of the proposed corporation is adequate support
for the implication of a promise to organize a corporation reasonably
capable of performing the contracts made for it by the promoterincorporator. Some such idea is inherent in Professor Williston's suggestion of adoption by novation consented to in advance; for it would
be manifest injustice to imply consent to a novation with any but a
corporation reasonably competent to carry out the contract.
It would seem, therefore, that the force of the policy of double
security for persons contracting with promoters largely disappears when
such persons know that the promoter is acting only for a corporation
that he proposed to incorporate. Credit is not so easily secured as to
imply that business men do not know what they are doing and that
they should, like infants, be specially protected. Unless, therefore, it is
fairly to be deduced from the contract that the parties in fact intended
the promoter to be liable as if the contract were his personal contract
alone, no sound policy demands that the promoter be held liable against
his intention. Particularly does this seem true of the case of an incorporator who has, under the Michigan statute, power to bind the corporation
immediately upon its incorporation by contracts made prior thereto. If it
be conceded that the instant section is intended to make the corporation
liable, then the position of the incorporators who acted under the statute
seems to be essentially that of agents whose principal has ratified the acts
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of the agents; and, in the absence of a fairly deducible pledge of personal
liability in addition to the pledge to organize a corporation reasonably
capable of carrying out the contracts, the incorporators may reasonably
be treated as agents, liable only for failure to organize in a proper
manner and for any misrepresentations they may have made. Such
seems to have been the conclusion of the Michigan court.28
·
Roy L. Rogers

23 Whether Michigan has _ever been committed to the full implications of Kelner
v. Baxter, L. R. 2 C. P. 174 (1886), is not at all clear. Compare the principal case,
Hart Potato Growers' Assn. v. Grenier, 236 Mich. 638, 211 N. W. 45 (1926),
, Esper v. Miller, 131 Mich. 334, 91 N. W. 613 (1902), Durgin v. Smith, 133 Mich.
331, 94 N. W. 1044 (1903), and Lockwood v. Wynkoop, 178 Mich. 388, 144 N. W.
846 (1914), with Belding Land & Improvement Co. v. City of Belding, 128 Mich.
79, 87 N. W. 113 (1901), and Carmody v. Powers, 60 Mich. 26, 26 N. W. 801
( 18 86). If the Michigan court has not been completely satisfied with the doctrine
of Kelner v. Baxter and with the double security policy, the interpretation of the
statute made in the principal case is considerably less revolutionary than would otherwise be the case.

